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 1EMPIRICAL TESTS OF OPTIMAL COGNITIVE DISTANCE 
 
Introduction 
Diversity is a crucial condition for learning and innovation, to produce Schumpeterian ‘novel 
combinations’, as demonstrated in evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982). Diversity is 
associated with the number of agents (people, firms) with different knowledge and/or skills, who are 
involved in a process of learning or innovation by interaction. However, next to the number of agents 
involved, a second dimension of diversity is the degree to which their knowledge or skills are 
different. This yields the notion of  ‘cognitive distance’, based on a constructivist, interactionist view 
of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Mead, 1934; Nooteboom, 2000; 
Weick, 1979, 1995). According to this view, people perceive, interpret, understand and evaluate the 
world according to mental categories (or cognitive frames, or models, cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983), which 
they have developed in interaction with their physical and social environment. As a result, people see 
and know the world differently to the extent that their cognition has developed in different conditions 
(national, regional and organizational culture, customs/habits, social norms/values, education, 
technologies, markets). This yields the notion of cognitive distance, and the notion of a firm as a 
‘focusing device’, as part of a ‘cognitive theory of the firm’, proposed by Nooteboom (2000, 2002). 
We summarize the key features of the theory. 
Here, cognition is to be seen in a broad sense, including not only rational evaluation but also 
emotion-laden value judgements, and heuristics of attribution, inference and decision-making that we 
know from social psychology (Bazerman, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). In a firm, people 
need to achieve a common purpose, and for this they need some more or less tacit shared ways of 
seeing and interpreting the world. In view of incentive problems, in monitoring and control, especially 
in contemporary organizations of more or less autonomous professionals, and the desire for intrinsic 
next to extrinsic motives (Frey, 2002), people in organizations also need to share more or less tacit 
values and norms, to align objectives, govern relational risk and to provide a basis for conflict 
resolution. Elsewhere in this special issue, it is shown that due to uncertainty concerning 
contingencies of collaboration, and limited opportunities for monitoring, ex ante measures of 
governance are seldom complete, and need to be supplemented with ex-post adaptation. 
Organizational focus, provided by organizational culture, yields an epistemological and normative 
‘substrate’ to achieve this, as basis for shared processes of attribution, mutual adaptation and 
decision-making. In other words, cognitive distance needs to be restricted for the sake of coordination. 
Organizational culture incorporates fundamental views and intuitions regarding the relation between 
the firm and its environment, attitude to risk, the nature of knowledge, the nature of man and of 
relations between people, which inform content and process of strategy, organizational structure, and 
styles of decision-making and coordination (Schein, 1985).  
 2Organizational focus needs to be tight, in the sense of allowing for little ambiguity and variety 
of meanings and standards, if the productive system of a firm, for the sake of exploitation, is 
‘systemic’, as opposed to ‘stand–alone’ (Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Exploitation is systemic 
when there is a complex division of labor, with many elements and a dense structure of relations 
between them, with tight constraints on their interfaces. An example is an oil refinery. In more stand-
alone systems, elements of the system are connected with few other elements, and connections are 
loose, allowing for some ambiguity and deviation from standards on interfaces. An example is a 
consultancy firm. An intermediate system, between systemic and stand-alone, is a modular system. 
Here, there are also multiple, connected elements, as in the systemic case, but the standards on 
interfaces allow for variety, where different modules can be plugged into the system. 
Organizational focus yields a risk of myopia (in ‘group think’): relevant opportunities and 
threats to the firm are not seen. To compensate for this, firms need outside contacts for ‘external 
economy of cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom, 1992). On the basis of different experiences, with different 
technologies and different markets, and different organizational histories, in other words at some 
cognitive distance, outside firms perceive, interpret and understand phenomena differently, and this 
may compensate for organizational myopia. This yields a new purpose for inter-organizational 
alliances (Nooteboom, 1999), next to the usual considerations, known from the alliance literature 
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Child and Faulkner, 1998; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Faulkner, 1995; 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Hagedoorn, 1993; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Killing, 1983, 
1988; Mowery, 1988; Ohmae, 1989; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Porter, 1986). 
The different foci of firms entail cognitive distance between firms. In processes of learning 
and innovation, in interaction between firms, this yields both an opportunity and a problem. The 
opportunity lies in diversity: the novelty value of a relation increases with cognitive distance. 
However, mutual understanding decreases with cognitive distance. If effectiveness of learning by 
interaction is the mathematical product of novelty value and understandability, the result is an 
inverse-U shaped relation with cognitive distance. Optimal cognitive distance lies at the maximum of 
the curve. This is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
In Figure 1, the downward sloping line represents understandability. The upward sloping line 
represents the novelty value of a relation. The optimal level of cognitive distance from a learning 
perspective lies in-between very low and very high levels of cognitive distance. The purpose of this 




The hypothesis concerning ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ entails that greater 
uncertainty in an industry, in terms of the volatility of technology and markets, yields a greater need 
to engage in outside relations with other organizations, to correct for the myopia of organizational 
focus. Thus, the hypothesis entails that in such industries there will be more outside relations, in 
interfirm alliances for innovation and technical development.
1  
On the whole, our analysis can be seen as complementary to transaction cost economics 
(TCE) (Williamson 1975, 1985), by extending it with a perspective of learning. However, some 
predictions from our analysis would deviate from those of TCE. In particular, TCE argues that 
uncertainty yields greater risk of opportunism, which needs to be controlled either by hierarchy, or, in 
hybrid forms of organization, by ‘relational governance’, in close cooperation. We acknowledge the 
logic of this argument, but our argument of cognitive distance indicates that for learning too close and 
durable relations may reduce cognitive distance too much, reducing the learning potential of the 
relationship. In sum, for generating technological breakthroughs one may need less integration, in 
hierarchy or relational governance, than suggested by TCE.         
Prior research has been consistent with this idea, without, however, explicitly testing it. 
Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) suggest that in turbulent knowledge-intensive industries, 
where knowledge bases are complex and dispersed, interfirm cooperation is crucial as innovation 
takes places in networks of partnerships rather than in individual firms. One example is the 
pharmaceutical industry, where the growth of biotechnology has caused a greater dispersion of 
technological knowledge throughout the pharmaceutical industry, which has subsequently been the 
main driver for pharmaceutical firms to engage in alliances with biotechnology firms. The hypothesis 
of an increased need for alliances under conditions of volatility has further been confirmed by 
Colombo and Garrone (1998). They analyze the strategies of telecommunication carriers in the early 
‘90s and find that in Internet services and content where technology and demand uncertainty were 
especially high, the relative rate of alliance formation was higher than in other communication 
industries characterized by absence of such extreme uncertainty. In addition, in the former industries a 
large share of the alliances established by telecommunication carriers had an inter-sectoral nature, 
                                                       
1 Real option theory (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) argues that in an uncertain business environment, there is an 
opportunity cost of making an irreversible investment expenditure due to the lost option value of waiting for new 
information to arrive. Therefore, with great uncertainty firms may refrain from transaction-specific investments to 
avoid the risk of incurring sunk costs if unpredicted contingencies occur and conserve flexibility and ease of 
adjustment (Pindyck, 1988 and 1993). With all else equal, the need for hierarchical governance structures is 
reduced. In this sense, real option theory and the cognitive theory of the firm have coincident predictions. 
Nonetheless, contrary to real option theory, the cognitive theory of the firm also has predictions as to the identity 
of alliance partners (see infra). 
 4linking them with firms from a variety of industries; this suggests that external economies of cognitive 
scope may have played a key role in alliance formation.  
Now we turn to our more explicit tests of the hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance. We 
provide two independent tests in two different empirical settings. The first one focuses on vertical 
R&D agreements in which large pharmaceutical firms source technological knowledge from small 
upstream biotechnology firms. This test focuses exclusively on the technological dimension of 
cognitive distance. The second one concerns agreements (both horizontal and vertical) in information 
and communication technology (ICT) industries. Even though such agreements have diverse  
objectives, for reasons that will be explained later mutual learning in the technological and/or 
organizational spheres plays a crucial role. This second test considers both the technological and 
organizational dimensions of cognitive distance. By focusing on two different empirical settings, we 
hope to provide a richer perspective on the different aspects of cognitive distance. 
In the first test, we focus on a pharmaceutical firm’s overall technological cognitive distance 
with its biotechnology partners, and its impact on the generation of technological innovations. The 
organizational cognitive distance dimension is less relevant in this setting, as all agreements take 
place between small innovative biotechnology firms on the one hand and large established 
pharmaceutical firms on the other hand. In other words, there is minimal variation across agreements 
in organizational cognitive distance. For pharmaceutical firms, the major objective of these upstream 
R&D agreements is to access external knowledge bases and not to miss out on promising 
technological developments. For the biotechnology firms,  the primary objective is not assimilating 
new technological knowledge but rather gaining legitimacy and experience (Baum, Calabrese and 
Silverman, 2000) as well as gaining access to marketing and production capabilities once the drug has 
been developed (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). While in this test we have a direct measure 
of technological innovation, we do not have a direct measure of cognitive distance. Rather, we assume 
that the more pharmaceutical firms cooperate with the same partners over time in their agreement 
portfolio, the lower will be the average cognitive distance with their partners. This assumption is 
consistent with an earlier finding that cognitive distance decreases as interaction is more frequent 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 1995). With the subsidiary hypothesis that such ongoing 
collaboration reduces cognitive distance, we can test the derived hypothesis that technological 
innovation has an inverse U-shaped relation with the extent to which agreements are spread over a 
larger number of different partners (henceforth referred to as ‘partner dispersion’). This hypothesis is 
confirmed. Details on the data and the estimation procedure are given in the next section. 
For a second test, we employ data from the ARPA database developed at Politecnico di 
Milano on alliances established in the ‘80s in ICT industries. As was said earlier, the scope of 
activities and the objectives of the agreements considered in this test vary in a way that we are unable 
to observe.  Nevertheless, the early '80s were a very turbulent period in ICT industries, as they were 
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connected with the liberalization of telecommunication services. As a result, firms were forced to 
upgrade their technological capabilities and adopt new business models. As a consequence, we 
assume here that the assimilation of new technological and organizational knowledge through the 
interaction with other firms was an important determinant of alliance formation (albeit not the unique 
and sometimes not even the most important one), independently of the specific nature of the 
agreements under consideration. Here, we do have a more direct measure of technological cognitive 
distance, as well as a set of indicators for organizational cognitive distance. Unfortunately, we lack a 
measure of innovative performance. With the subsidiary hypothesis that firms chose the partners of 
their collaborative relations so as to maximize the probability of success, and that this latter depends 
on the effectiveness of mutual learning processes, we can test the derived hypothesis that the 
likelihood of alliance formation has an inverse U-shaped relation with cognitive distance. That 
hypothesis is also partially confirmed. Details on the data and the estimation procedure are given in a 
following section.    
  In short, we provide two tests in different settings that highlight different aspects of the 
optimal cognitive distance hypothesis. The test in the pharmaceutical industry studies vertical R&D 
agreements and relies on a narrow interpretation of cognitive distance (restricted to the technological 
dimension). The test in the ICT sector studies agreements with different domains of activity, adopting 
a more comprehensive interpretation of cognitive distance (including both the technological and 
organizational dimensions). In both tests, we assume learning to be central to the agreements under 
study. 
 
Agreement portfolios in the pharmaceutical industry –  
Technological Cognitive Distance 
 
  For a first empirical test of the hypothesis on cognitive distance, we constructed a database on 
interfirm cooperation in the pharmaceutical industry. In this industry, knowledge bases are complex 
and dispersed, which is an incentive for firms to develop portfolios of agreements with other firms in 
order to access external knowledge bases (Dutta and Weiss, 1997; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 
1996). Such R&D agreements are vehicles for learning and they enhance a firm’s external economy of 
cognitive scope, which in turn enhances that firm’s ability to come up with unique technological 
innovations.  
While it is generally accepted, both in academia and in practice, that R&D agreement 
portfolios contribute to a firm’s innovative success, one of the most important strategic concerns in 
the pharmaceutical industry remains how to optimally develop a portfolio of R&D agreements 
(Bamford and Ernst, 2001). Despite the importance of such portfolios, only few empirical studies 
 6have studied the implications of their composition (Dutta and Weiss, 1997; Wuyts, Dutta and 
Stremersch, 2004). The one portfolio characteristic that deserves special attention in view of the 
theory of cognitive distance is the extent to which firms distribute their agreements over different 
partners. High levels of such ‘partner dispersion’ (as operationalized by the ratio of the total number 
of different partners over the total number of agreements) are assumed to be associated with high 
cognitive distance between the focal firm and its total set of partners. If a firm’s portfolio of 
agreements is characterized by low levels of partner dispersion, this firm tends to cooperate more 
frequently with the same partners.
2 Such repeated interaction allows for the creation of relationship-
specific heuristics and shared mental models that reduce cognitive distance, and, hence, facilitate the 
transfer of the tacit components of knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Uzzi, 1997). This is crucial in 
technology-intensive science-based industries such as the pharmaceutical industry, as novel scientific 
discoveries are seldom codified (Zucker, Darby and Armstrong, 2002). However, at very low levels of 
partner dispersion (frequent cooperation with the same partners) technological cognitive distance can 
decrease so much that the novelty of knowledge flows is insufficient to generate technological 
innovations. Recent work on relational embeddedness in economic sociology provides additional 
support for the argument that cooperating too frequently with the same partners over time lowers the 
novelty value of information flows (Uzzi, 1997). Hence, firms should seek the optimal level of 
cognitive distance in their portfolio of R&D agreements that allows for the transfer of tacit knowledge 
but maintains a level of novelty of knowledge flows. 
  In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, we therefore expect that a firm’s ability to come 
up with novel technologies is a function of the level of partner dispersion in its portfolio of R&D 
agreements. It is important to note that this is a derived hypothesis, as our dataset does not allow for a 
direct measure of technological cognitive distance. Rather, we rely on the assumption that partner 
dispersion is an indicator of cognitive distance. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The likelihood of coming up with novel technologies in the pharmaceutical industry 





Our first test focuses on the pharmaceutical industry, a technology-intensive industry where 
interfirm cooperation is considered to be crucial for success (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Baum, 
Calabrese and Silverman, 2000; Powell, 1998). Interfirm cooperation in the pharmaceutical industry 
                                                       
2 We acknowledge that the duration of the agreements would be useful additional information to reflect the 
frequency of interaction. Unfortunately, alliance databases typically do not provide this information. By focusing 
on only upstream R&D agreements covering one R&D project, we have tried to minimize potential biases caused 
by our lack of duration data. 
 7boomed with the rise of biotechnology. Biotechnology includes all techniques by which humans 
control biological processes of breeding organisms for some specific purposes (Amburgey, Dacin and 
Singh, 1996). While traditional biotech systematically controls and alters the environments of large 
colonies of bacteria and induces them to multiply in large quantities (e.g., fermentation), new biotech 
consists of techniques of recombinant DNA and cell fusion, which allows scientists to manipulate the 
inner structures of micro-organisms. The discovery of recombinant DNA (by Cohen and Boyer in 
1973) and cell fusion (by Kohler and Milstein in 1975) gave birth to the modern biotech industry. In 
the eighties, a series of other events influenced the role of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical 
industry (Amburgey, Dacin and Singh, 1996; Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1994). In 1980 the Supreme 
Court ruled that genetically engineered micro-organisms were patentable. In 1982 the FDA approved 
the first major biotech-drug for marketing, Genentech’s human insuline. From the mid-eighties on, 
pharmaceutical firms started to engage in R&D agreements with small innovative biotechnology 
firms. Such interfirm agreements provide biotechs with access to capital as well as to capabilities for 
getting approval for drugs and for commercialization and distribution of approved drugs. For 
pharmaceutical firms, on the other hand, such R&D agreements provide access to external knowledge 
bases that might yield important new opportunities for technological advance. Our database of 
interfirm agreements starts in 1985, i.e., at the inception of alliance activity in this industry. 
 
Data description 
We constructed a database consisting of information on (1) R&D agreements between 
pharmaceutical firms and biotechnology firms, (2) new drugs developed by these pharmaceutical 
firms and that are technologically unique, and (3) different firm characteristics (see also Wuyts, Dutta 
and Stremersch, 2004). More specifically, we combined data from three different sources. 
First, the R&D alliance data were collected from Recombinant Capital, a consulting firm 
experienced in the biotechnology industry. Their recap database covers all R&D agreements between 
pharmaceutical firms and biotech firms from 1985 until today. In order to allow for a fine-grained test 
of the cognitive distance hypothesis, we confine our attention to 18 major pharmaceutical firms that 
have all developed large and technologically diversified agreement portfolios over the last decades. 
While these portfolios are similar in size and technological diversity (i.e., the first dimension of 
diversity as discussed at the outset), there is substantial variance – over time and between firms – in 
the extent to which firms ally with the same partners. Note that we only consider R&D agreements 
(no joint ventures, mergers, or acquisitions) that in general cover one specific R&D project. While 
this may be a limitation of our dataset, our focus on R&D agreements lends more credence to our 
assumption that the individual agreements are approximately of equal length and strength. Altogether, 
the pharmaceutical firms in our sample were involved in 571 R&D agreements during the observation 
period. 
 8Second, we need a measure of technological innovation. Information on new drugs that are 
technologically unique is collected from the drug approval list of the Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA). Not only does the FDA provide information on all new drugs approved in each year, it also 
distinguishes technologically unique drugs from drugs that are based on prior technology. More 
precisely, the FDA assigns a chemical type to each newly approved drug. Only drugs of chemical type 
1 represent a new technology different from the established technologies, as they involve an “active 
ingredient that has never been marketed before”. An example of such a chemical type 1 drug is 
Novartis’ Zometa drug, approved in 2001, which involves a completely new active ingredient 
(zoledronic acid) for treating the deterioration of cancer patients’ inner bone structure (hypercalcemia 
of malignancy). Drugs based on a previously approved active ingredient are not considered a 
technological innovation. The FDA provides this detailed information only for drugs approved from 
1991 on. The pharmaceutical firms from our sample received approval for 64 drugs of chemical type 1 
in the period 1991-2000. 
Third, we collected firm-specific variables from the Compustat database. 
 
Variables and measures 
Technological innovation. Our dependent variable is a 0/1 variable indicating whether or not 
firm i generates a drug of chemical type 1 in year t, i.e., a drug that is technologically unique. 
Partner dispersion. We construct an index, NPit/NAit , where NPit denotes the total cumulative 
number of different partners in firm i’s agreement portfolio from 1985 up to year t, and NAit denotes 
the total cumulative number of R&D agreements in firm i’s agreement portfolio from 1985 up to year 
t. The index varies in the interval [0;1] in which values close to 1 represent a portfolio where 
agreements are signed with many different partners (indicating that overall cognitive distance is 
large), while values close to 0 represent portfolios with a very limited number of different partners 
(indicating that overall cognitive distance is small). In our sample, values of partner dispersion varied 
from 0.40 to 1.00. (mean = 0.87; s.d. = 0.10). In our model we lag partner dispersion with one period. 
Note that the cumulative character, as well as the lag structure, strengthen the causality of our 
findings in that technological innovation at time t is influenced by the level of partner dispersion of a 
firm’s portfolio of agreements in the period 1985 – (t-1). 
Control variables 
While we are particularly interested in the effect of repeated partnering on the probability of 
technological innovation, there are several other variables we should control for. 
R&D expenditures. In the first place, we control for the firm’s own expenditures in research 
and development. We expect that the more firms spend on research and development, the more they 
are innovative. 
 9Firm size. The effect of firm size on innovation is unclear, especially in industries where firm 
boundaries become vague due to large numbers of interfirm linkages (Pisano 1990). Also, we focus 
only on large firms. Yet, we include firm size as a control variable. 
Time trend and industry shocks. Prior studies have found a negative time trend due to the 
growing intensity of competitiveness in the biotechnology industry (e.g., Zucker, Darby and Brewer 
1994). We also include year dummy variables, in order to control for industry shocks that may have 
occurred in this volatile industry. 
Prior technological innovations. A final control variable is a firm’s stock of prior unique 
technological innovations. This variable is a count variable that equals the cumulative number of 
approved technologically innovative drugs for firm i from 1991 up to year t. This variable not only 
captures experience effects, but also covers the internal processes and structures that are set in place 
in order to develop innovative drugs. We expect that a firm’s track record of prior technological 
innovations enhances the probability that it will come up with a new technological innovation in year 
t. 
We lagged all variables with one period, except for the trend and the year dummies. Table 1 
summarizes the explanatory variables of the first empirical test; descriptive statistics are reported in 
Table 2.  Table 3 summarizes the expected effects. 
 
Empirical test  
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we estimated a logit model.
3 As 
independent variables we include repeated partnering and its quadratic term, as well as the control 
variables described above. Table 4 reports the results.  
In view of the panel data structure of our data, we studied whether our results are biased by 
unobserved heterogeneity. More specifically, we re-estimated the logit model using a latent class 
modelling technique (e.g., Kamakura and Russell, 1989; Wedel and DeSarbo, 1994), in order to 
identify the number of different underlying latent segments among the pharmaceutical firms. Latent 
class modelling is a discrete mixture approach that allows one to capture unobserved heterogeneity by 
identifying different classes of firms in the sample that are internally homogeneous, but that differ 
from other classes in terms of the effects of the covariates. Based on Schwarz’ Bayesian Information 
Criterion (1978), we found that the optimal number of latent segments equals 1, which indicates that 
the extent of unobserved heterogeneity is small. This comes as no surprise given our focus on a 
narrow set of firms that are very similar. As an additional check, we included firm dummy variables, 
corresponding with a fixed effects specification, and found none of these dummies to be significant 
except for two: Pharmacia (at 5% level) and Smithkline (close to significance) seem to be 
                                                       
3 The underlying assumption of a logistic cumulative distribution function does not affect the results: we found 
very similar results under alternative specifications, such as a probit specification. 
 10significantly better at achieving technological advance for reasons not covered by our explanatory 
variables. In view of the limited number of observations and the insignificance of the other firm 
effects, we include these two dummy variables in the final model. Including other portfolio 
descriptors, such as portfolio size and technological diversity, did not affect the results either. Finally, 
we tested the robustness of our results using different lag structures and, again, found our results to be  
robust. 
As mentioned above, we also included year dummy variables in order to capture time-specific 
heterogeneity. We find only one of these dummies to be significant, namely for 1996. We include this 
dummy in the final model. We estimated two logit models, one with and one without the partner 
dispersion terms (see Table 4). Our main interest goes to the significant inverted U effect of partner 
dispersion in Model 2 (main term: =58.537; p<0.05; quadratic term: =-33.908; p<0.05), in support 
of hypothesis 1.
4 Our results indicate that technological innovations are most likely to occur at 
intermediate levels of partner dispersion, i.e., in firms that strike a balance between engaging in 
different R&D agreements with the same partners and avoiding lock-in with a too narrow set of 
partners. Of the control variables, R&D expense has the expected positive effect (=0.001; p<0.01). 
Surprisingly, the prior stock of technological innovations does not affect the probability of developing 
a new technological innovation. Further exploratory analyses show that this effect turns positive and 
significant when excluding the firm dummy variables, which is explained by both Pharmacia and 
Smithkline’s strong ability to develop technological innovations. Further in-depth research may reveal 
why these two firms are so successful in developing drugs that are technologically unique. We find a 
negative time trend (=-0.108; p<0.10), which may be an indication of increased competition as the 
industry developed. The two firm dummies and the one year dummy we retained are all significant or 
close to significance at 10% level. The difference in log likelihood with Model 1 (which doesn’t 
contain the partner dispersion effects) is significant at 5% level, underscoring the explanatory power 
of partner dispersion and thus, indirectly, of technological cognitive distance. 
Concluding, our first empirical test provides indirect support for the technological cognitive 
distance hypothesis. We followed prior work that points to the decrease in cognitive distance that 
results from repeated interaction between exchange partners (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 
1995), and assumed that repeatedly allying with the same partners in a firm’s portfolio of agreements 
lowers overall cognitive distance. Our analysis in the pharmaceutical industry reveals that a portfolio 
composition characterized by intermediate levels of repeated partnering, i.e., at intermediate levels of 
cognitive distance, is associated with the highest probability of unique technological innovation. 
 
                                                       
4 Note that the optimum (0.85) lies within the range of values in our dataset ([0.4;1]), which implies that we can 
interpret the significance of the main and quadratic term as indication of an inverted U effect. 
 11Alliance formation in ICT industries –  
Technological and Organizational Cognitive Distance 
 
  The second empirical test was conducted in ICT industries (i.e. semiconductor, data 
processing, and telecommunications) and considered alliance formation in the 1981-1986 period. In 
such industries the early 1980s were marked by high volatility of technology and markets. Major 
innovations occurred, such as the IBM PC introduced in late 1981; and technological competition was 
aggressive both between incompatible platforms within a particular segment (e.g. the DOS, CP/M and 
Apple platforms in the microcomputer segment) and across different industry segments (e.g. between 
microcomputers and minicomputers, between supermini and mainframes). In addition, the break-up of 
ATT radically modified the institutional environment of telecommunication services, with important 
implications for the competitive scenario in all ICT industries. Technological competencies and 
business models that had dominated the earlier decade rapidly became obsolete (e.g. the notions of 
"open architecture" and "modular design" rapidly gained ground, to the detriment of reliance on 
proprietary standards and vertical integration).
5 Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that in the 
period under scrutiny, inter-organizational learning and (both technological and organizational) 
innovation were key drivers of firms’ alliance strategy.  
  In this setting, we expect that not only technological cognitive distance but also 
organizational cognitive distance exerted a crucial influence on the choice of alliance partners. In fact, 
to the extent that mutual learning is an important motivation for the establishment of an alliance, the 
success of the alliance will require an optimal level of technological and organizational cognitive 
distance. Note that the former aspect may be less relevant than the latter one in the current context 
where contrary to the first empirical test, alliances cover a diversity of activities (e.g. production, 
marketing and sale) rather than only R&D, and may have various objectives (e.g. rationalization of 
production, entry into a new market, definition of a new standard). In fact, moderate differences 
between alliance partners in strategic characteristics that mold their mental maps and organizational 
routines may be a source of novelty, enhance organizational learning and favor assimilation of new 
business models (as compared to low differences). On the contrary, very large differences limit 
mutual understanding and hence learning, while they substantially increase the likelihood of conflicts 
within an alliance.
6 Medium levels of understandability in terms of organizational culture and 
strategic behavior may aid in attaining smooth and fruitful cooperation.
7 In short, we expect that the 
                                                       
5 For a thorough discussion of technological competition in ICT industries in the period under study and its 
implications for industry dynamics, see for instance Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), Langlois and Robertson 
(1992). 
6 This latter aspect is particularly relevant in horizontal alliances with a learning objective, as they bear the risk 
that the partner firms, that may well be competitors outside of the boundaries of their alliance, end up in a 
learning race that inhibits smooth cooperation (Doz and Hamel, 1998). 
7 For a similar view of inter-organizational learning in a different context, see Vermeulen and Barkema (2001). 
 12likelihood of alliance formation is thus highest at medium levels of technological as well as 
organizational cognitive distance between firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The likelihood of alliance formation in ICT industries is highest for firms that have 
medium levels of technological and organizational cognitive distance. 
 
Data description 
The data on alliances used in this paper are provided by the ARPA database developed at 
Politecnico di Milano. ARPA surveyed agreements in ICT industries between 1980 and 1986. ICT 
industries account for a substantial share of the total number of agreements concluded by firms and 
the rate of formation of new alliances peaked in the mid 1980s (see Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 
1992). ARPA includes data on 2,014 cooperative agreements established by 1,177 independent 
partners (for further information on the ARPA database, see Cainarca, Colombo and Mariotti, 1992; 
Colombo, 1995). As ARPA relies on secondary sources of information (the international financial 
press and sector magazines), it suffers from a series of problems that typically affect such sources. For 
our purposes the main shortcoming is lack of information on the objectives of alliances (see Glaister 
and Buckley 1996 for a discussion of this problem). This is a source of observational noise, as we are 
unable to separate agreements for which mutual learning, especially in the technology sphere, is a key 
motivation, and cognitive distance (in particular, technological cognitive distance) crucially 
influences the choice of partners, from other agreements for which  cognitive distance may play a 
more modest role. In addition, ARPA suffers from selection biases. In particular, press coverage is 
probably biased towards large firms and glamorous events. So alliances between small firms, alliances 
of limited strategic importance, and alliances between firms that are already involved in several 
collaborations with each other (unless such later alliances are of great strategic importance) are likely 
to be underrepresented in the ARPA database. This notwithstanding, ARPA  provides a reasonably 
accurate coverage of the alliance activity in ICT industries all over the world of international 
companies of medium and large size. In particular, there is no reason to believe that the above 
mentioned sample selection biases substantially influence the relation between the likelihood of 
sample firms having established one or more alliances between each other in the period under scrutiny 
and cognitive distance between them.
8  
                                                       
8 In this paper we assume that cognitive distance decreases with the number of partnerships established by two 
firms with each other. As was said above, press coverage may be somewhat biased towards novel events. With all 
else equal, the first alliance between any two firms is more likely to be included in the ARPA database than the n-
th one. Therefore, there may indeed be a selection bias in our data set of alliances, as we may  miss some 
alliances between cognitively close firms. Note however that as will be explained later, the binary dependent 
variable we use in the econometric analysis does not discriminate according to the number of alliances between 
two firms, as it only distinguishes cooperating and non-cooperating pairs of firms. Furthermore, the period under 
scrutiny is relatively short and our measures of cognitive distance are quite sticky over time (on this aspect see 
also footnote 10). Hence, cross-firm differences in cognitive distance are likely to be much larger than 
differences over time relating to a given pair of firms.  
 13In this study, we consider alliances established in 1981-1986 between 67 out of the world’s 
largest 150 firms that operated in ICT industries. Such firms comply with two criteria: i) data relating 
to organizational and financial characteristics (i.e. sales, R&D expenditures, profits, distribution of 
sales by industry) were available for the entire period under scrutiny, and ii) firms were also 
represented in the database on corporate US patent activity set up at the University of Reading. The 
Reading database records the patents granted by the US patent office to 784 large firms that together 
account for over 46% of all patents granted in the US between 1969 and 1995. Each patent is 
classified by the type of technological activity with which it is primarily associated, using a 
classification scheme derived from the US patent class system (for a fuller discussion of these data 
and their classification see Cantwell, 1993).  
Taking the above-mentioned 67 firms, there are a possible 2,211 pairwise combinations 
between them. Our basic unit of analysis consisted of variables constructed across these 2,211 pairs of 
firms.  
 
Variables and measures 
Alliance formation 
We model the likelihood of firms i and j (i,j=1,…,67; ij) establishing one or more alliances 
with each other in the 1981-1986 period. More precisely, the dependent variable equals 0 if the two 
firms under consideration did not cooperate with each other; otherwise it equals 1 independently of 
the number and nature of the collaborative relations.  The set of covariates includes indicators of 
(technological and organizational) cognitive distance between firms and control variables. 
Measures of cognitive distance 
As was said earlier, cognitive distance has different dimensions. While in the previous test we 
strictly focused on technological cognitive distance, we now also account for organizational cognitive 
distance.  
Accordingly, we distinguish between two sets of indicators. The first group consists of 
variables that measure differences in organizational and strategic characteristics of firms. We assume 
that the organization and strategy of firms are the result of a historical, cumulative process that shapes 
the way firms interpret and react to the external word. It follows that different strategic and 
organizational characteristics mirror the presence of different mental models, organizational routines, 
corporate culture, and management style. In particular, we consider differences between firms in size, 
with SIMILARSIZE being an inverse measure of size differentials between firms, diversification 
(DIVERSIF and SCOPE), and profit margins (ROS). On the one hand, large, widely diversified 
firms generally exhibit a larger managerial hierarchy with several intermediate managerial layers, 
more decentralization and formalization of decision authority, and greater specialization of 
managerial tasks than their smaller counterparts that operate in one (or a small number of) 
 14business(es).
9 In addition, they rely to a much larger extent on standardization of tasks and financial 
controls rather than strategic controls to cope with agency problems within the managerial hierarchy 
(see Eisenhardt, 1985; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988). On the other hand, high profit margins are 
indicative of market power; accordingly, firms with high profit margins generally follow a strategy 
based on product differentiation and non-price competitive factors (e.g brand, customer care). On the 
contrary, low profit margins are typical of firms that operate in commodity-like businesses 
characterized by price competition; under such circumstances, product standardization aimed at 
capturing scale economies and tight cost control are far more important for competitive success. Size 
and profit margins are measured by the mean values of sales and returns on sales in the 1981-1986 
period, respectively. Differences in the extent of diversification between firms are measured by two 
indices: DIVERSIF is the difference between the mean values of the Utton diversification index 
based on the 2-digit SIC classification, while SCOPE reflects differences as to the distribution of 
firms’ sales within ICT industries. In particular, we consider three industries – semiconductor, data 
processing, and telecommunications – and again use the Utton diversification index. 
We argue that if firms are quite close in the strategy space, with the four indicators of 
cognitive distance that measure size, diversification, and profit margins taking similar values, they are 
likely to adopt similar business models and have similar mental maps, organizational routines, 
corporate culture and management style. Under such circumstances, there will not be much to learn 
from each other. If organizational cognitive distance is very large, organizational learning will be 
difficult, even though potentially valuable to firms; in fact, lack of mutual understanding will result in 
large coordination costs. In addition, as firms have different visions of the world, the likelihood of 
conflicts between alliance partners will be greater. Therefore, we expect the probability of 
cooperation between any two firms first to increase and then to decrease with greater values of the 
variables that measure organizational cognitive distance.  
 The second group of variables focuses on technology-based indicators. More specifically, we 
consider differences in both the intensity of the resources devoted by firms to R&D activity and the 
pattern of allocation of such resources across technological fields. With all else equal, cognitive 
distance will be large if firms focus on different technologies. It will also increase with the different 
research intensity of their operations. R&D is the difference between the average values in the 
period under scrutiny of the R&D to sales ratio of firms. CRTA is the Pearson correlation index of the 
distribution across 31 technological classes related to ICT of the revealed technological advantages 
(RTA) of each firm relative to the other sample firms. The RTA of a firm in a particular technological 
field is defined as the firm's share in that field of the US patents granted to all companies in the study, 
                                                       
9 On the organizational peculiarities of large, diversified firms see for instance the seminal work by Chandler 
(1962). Colombo and Delmastro (1999) analyze a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms, showing that the 
number of managerial layers and the delegation of decision-making power increase with an increase of firm size. 
 15relative to its overall share of all US patents granted to these companies. The RTA index varies 
around one, such that a value greater than one suggests that a firm is comparatively specialized in the 
technology in question, given its overall innovative performance. Positive values of CRTA indicate 
similarity of the pattern of relative technological specialization of firms, as it appears from the 
distribution of their patent activity across technological fields.
10 In accordance with the existence of 
an "optimal" technological cognitive distance between firms, we predict positive and negative 
coefficients for the linear and squared terms of both R&D and CRTA respectively. 
Other variables 
We introduced into the econometric model two additional sets of variables. The first group 
takes into account differences between firms as to their sector of operation and home country. In order 
to control for the latter aspect, we defined five dummy variables: USA, EUR, JAP, USA-EUR, and 
USA-JAP. As to the former aspect, SAMESECTOR equals 1 when two firms have the same primary 
sector of activity; COMMONSECTOR equals 1 if the two firms under scrutiny operate in one or more 
common sectors (except when such common sector is the primary sector of activity of both firms; in 
that case SAMESECTOR=1 and COMMONSECTOR=0). So the baseline in the model is given by 
pairs composed of a European firm and a Japanese firm with no overlapping operations. Differences 
in sector of activity and home country clearly influence cognitive distance between firms. However, 
they also reflect other aspects that are likely to affect firms' propensity towards alliance, namely the 
incentives for rival firms to teaming up due to competitive reasons and the alleged different 
propensity towards establishment of alliances on the part of firms located in different geographic 
regions (e.g. the greater propensity of Japanese firms, the smaller propensity of US firms). 
The second set of control variables takes into account factors that have no bearing on 
cognitive distance, but were found by previous studies to greatly affect the rate of alliance formation 
(for a discussion of such issue and related literature see for instance Colombo, 1995; Sakakibara, 
                                                       
10 More precisely, denoting by Pkj the number of US patents granted in technological field k to firm j, then the 
RTA index for each firm in that field is defined as follows: RTAkj = (Pkj/jPkj) / (kPkj/kjPkj). Note that the 
assumption is made here that in spite of the fact that the RTAs are based on data on patent activity, their 
distribution across technological fields reflects the relative distribution of both codified and tacit technological 
knowledge. In other words, the distributions across technological fields of firms' tacit and codified knowledge are 
closely correlated. For a more detailed discussion of CRTA see Cantwell and Barrera (1998), Cantwell and 
Colombo (2000). Such indicator is conceptually very close to Jaffe’s (1989) indicator of technological proximity. 
The main advantage is that use of RTA values allows to control for the fact that firms’ propensity to patent varies 
systematically across technologies. The main drawback of this patent-based measure of cognitive distance is that 
it must be based on a sufficiently large number of patents. So its use is confined to firms with substantial patent 
activity observed over a sufficiently long period of time. This is also the reason why RTAs are based on firms' 
patent activity in the whole period for which data are available (i.e. 1969-1995, see again Cantwell and Colombo, 
2000). We are aware that this choice may raise an endogeneity problem, as firms' patent activity in the 1982-
1995 period may be influenced by alliances established in the 1981-1986 period. Note however that a 
preliminary investigation showed that the patterns of technological specialization of sample firms are quite stable 
over time (on this topic see also Patel and Pavitt, 1997). Therefore, we assume that differences of CRTA across 
different pairs of firms are much larger then differences over time relating to the same pairs of firms. 
 162002). In particular, for each pair of firms we consider the sum of their size, profit margins, R&D 
intensity, and diversification.  
The definition of the explanatory variables is illustrated in Table 5; in Table 6 we report 
descriptive statistics, while Table 7 illustrates the predicted sign of the coefficients of such variables 
and the rationale underlying our expectations. 
 
Empirical test 
The results of the estimates of logit models of alliance formation are illustrated in Table 8. 
Model I is the benchmark: it includes only control variables that are unrelated to cognitive distance 
between firms. In accordance with the results of previous studies, the likelihood of establishing an 
alliance is found to increase with firm size, diversification, and R&D intensity; in contrast,  firms’ 
profit margins have no effect on alliance formation. In Model II we introduce a second set of control 
variables that account for firms’ home country and sector of operation. Quite unsurprisingly, such 
variables turn out to be highly significant, as is apparent by the value of the LR test (
2
(7)=61.8). The 
positive, statistically significant coefficient of SAMESECTOR indicates that firms that have the same 
primary sector of activity are more likely to collaborate than firms with no overlapping operations. In 
addition, inter-region alliances are generally found to be less likely than intra-region ones; alliances 
between US firms are the exception, possibly due to the deterrence effect of stricter anti-trust policy 
in the US than in other geographical areas (at least up to 1984 when the National Cooperative 
Research Act was issued, see Katz and Ordover, 1990).  
For our purposes, the most interesting findings are provided by Models III and IV, in which 
we introduced measures of technological and organizational cognitive distance, first in a linear 
specification (Model III) and then in a quadratic one (Model IV). First of all, the quadratic 
specification of cognitive distance adds considerable explanatory power to the model (see Model IV); 
in fact, the twelve coefficients of the cognitive distance variables are found to be jointly significant by 
a LR test (
2
(12)=28.6, significant at 1%). In accordance with our hypothesis, this is mainly due to the 
six squared terms introduced in Model IV (
2
(6)=17.9, significant at 1%). On the contrary, the 
additional explanatory power of the linear specification is modest; the six indicators of cognitive 




Let us now consider in greater detail the estimates of Model IV. Contrary to our predictions, 
the two technology-related indicators of cognitive distance (i.e. R&D and CRTA) have no significant  
effect on the likelihood of firms entering into cooperative relations with each other. We find greater 
support for the indicators that reflect strategic and organizational differences between firms. In fact, 
 17three out of the four indicators have the expected inverse U-shaped relationship
11 with propensity 
towards alliance, namely SIMILARSIZE, ROS and DIVERSIF, with both the linear and quadratic 
terms being significant at conventional confidence levels. Contrary to expectations, the coefficients of 
SCOPE are not significant, even though they have the predicted signs. 
  To sum up, after controlling for the effects of other factors (notably, the industry in which 
firms operate and their home country), we find some support for the hypothesis that in ICT industries 
there is an optimal organizational cognitive distance between firms, while the likelihood of alliance 
formation seems not to be a function of technological cognitive distance. Apparently, when selecting 
an alliance partner in this particular empirical context, firms care more about differences in business 
models. Technological distance seems to be less relevant. We will interpret this finding as well as the 
findings from the first empirical test in the concluding section. 
 
Limitations and Conclusions 
 
This article has provided two tests of hypotheses derived from the central hypothesis of 
optimal cognitive distance, that the outcome of learning or innovation by interaction is related to 
cognitive distance according to an inverse U-shaped curve. 
The first derived hypothesis was based on a combination of the basic hypothesis of optimal 
cognitive distance with a second hypothesis that cognitive distance decreases with increased 
frequency of interaction. This yielded the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relation between the 
probability of unique technological innovation and the extent to which firms ally with the same 
partners over time. That hypothesis was tested on data in the pharmaceutical industry, and was 
supported. The first empirical test concerned only upstream R&D agreements that were very similar 
to one another, and was restricted to the technological dimension of cognitive distance. The major 
limitation of this test was our lack of a direct measure of cognitive distance. Further research is 
required to corroborate our assumption that the overall cognitive distance a firm faces increases with 
increases in its agreement portfolio’s partner dispersion. The major managerial implication of this test 
is that cognitive distance may guide firms in their efforts to compose an optimal R&D agreement 
portfolio, i.e., a portfolio that enhances the probability to achieve unique technological advance. How 
to optimally compose such a portfolio is a major concern for managers in pharmaceutical firms 
(Bamford and Ernst, 2001; Powell, 1998). We find that in this complex industry, a relatively high 
level of partner dispersion can be recommended, but that firms should avoid mere maximization of 
partner dispersion: we argue that very high levels of partner dispersion create an almost unbridgeable 
cognitive gap and hence lowers the probability of generating technological innovations. 
                                                       
11 Note that also here we find that the optimum is within the range of values in the data set, which implies that the 
 18The second derived hypothesis was based on the auxiliary hypothesis that the likelihood of 
alliance formation increases with the expected payoff in terms of technological and/or organizational 
innovation. This yields the derived hypothesis that the likelihood of an alliance for innovation 
between any two firms has an inverse U-shaped relation with cognitive distance. That hypothesis was 
tested on data on both horizontal and vertical alliances in ICT industries, based on a broader 
interpretation of cognitive distance that also takes into account its organizational dimension. We 
found partial support. In particular, while technology-related measures of cognitive distance were 
found not to have any significant effect on the probability of allying, several indicators that reflect 
differences in firms’ organizational and strategic characteristics proved to have the expected inverse 
U-shaped relation. 
Interestingly, we find that in the context of alliances in ICT industries organizational 
cognitive distance was more important than technological cognitive distance, whereas in the context 
of upstream pharma-biotech cooperation technological distance prevails. There are several 
considerations for an explanation why organizational aspects turned out to be more important than 
technological ones in ICT industries. First, as data were provided by secondary sources of 
information, the precise motivations of the alliances under consideration remain unobserved. While 
there is reason to believe that mutual learning is an important motivation of (most of) such 
agreements, the joint development of new technological capabilities may be of crucial concern only in 
a subset of them. For those for which it is not (e.g. alliances aimed at eliminating excess production 
capacity, obtaining access to a new market, setting a standard), technological cognitive distance 
between firms will play a negligible role. Second, as was indicated in the theoretical introduction, 
when a technology is systemic, as is the case in ICT, then, almost by definition, organizational issues 
are more important than in the case of stand-alone technology, as in biotechnology. Third, according 
to innovation theory there is a cycle of innovation, where, after a stage of volatility, technology 
converges on a ‘dominant design’. Then demand and competition increase, and attention shifts to 
organization for commercialization (market entry, access to distribution channels) and efficient 
production, which may in turn lead to a dominant design in organization (Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy 
& Clark, 1985; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). In the period under examination, ICT industries were 
largely in that stage of shifting from technology to organization, whereas the pharmaceutical industry 
was clearly in a stage of high volatility. In sum, our explanation of the outcome is that in addition to 
the presence of an observational noise, in ICT industries learning is more oriented towards 
organization than technology, because the technology involved is systemic, requiring attention to 
coordination and integration of parts in ICT systems; and in the observation period the focus of 
innovation has shifted from technology to the design and implementation of new business models. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
significance of the quadratic term is an indication of an inverted U effect. 
 19Both tests are indirect, in opposite ways. In the first test we had a direct measure of innovative 
output, but not of cognitive distance. In the second test the reverse applied: we had several measures 
of cognitive distance, but not of innovative output. Clearly, for a direct test we need both a measure of 
cognitive distance and a measure of innovative output, and requisite control variables. That yields a 
priority for further research. However, the indirect tests presented in this article lend credence to the 
hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance, and yield promise for a direct test. Another direction for 
future research would be to study how the location of ‘optimal’ cognitive distance varies for firms 
with different levels of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Going one step further, one 
could endogenize absorptive capacity, allowing it to evolve over time for one and the same firm, and 
study the interaction over time between cognitive distance and absorptive capacity. 
  The implications of the hypothesis, if further confirmed, are several. It yields further 
arguments against integration of firms, in a merger or acquisition, in favor of alliances between firms 
that maintain their independence, in addition to familiar arguments from the alliance literature. 
Integration would yield reduced cognitive distance, resulting in lack of diversity for the sake of 
learning and unique technological advance. Thus, the hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance yields 
a correction on the argument from transaction cost economics that favors integration for the sake of 
governance, in case of transaction-specific investments and uncertainty about contingencies in the 
execution of agreements. We do not deny the relevance of that argument, but there may be an 
overriding argument against integration, to maintain cognitive distance. The hypothesis also goes 
against the argument from Langlois and Robertson (1995) and Chesbrough and Teece (1996) that 
when a production system is systemic, integration is needed to align innovation in different parts of 
the system, to maintain systemic coherence. Here also, we recognize the relevance of the argument, 
for innovation that is not ‘architectural’ (Henderson and Clark, 1990). However, architectural 
innovation entails the break-up of present systemic configuration, and, here again, the need for 
sufficient cognitive distance may yield an overriding counter-argument (as was, in fact, acknowledged 
by Langlois and Robertson). 
The results of this study may contribute to an understanding of a variety of phenomena in 
interfirm collaboration. It may, for example, contribute to an understanding of the recent phenomenon 
that the well-known Japanese vertical structures of keiretsu, e.g. in the car industry, are being 
disintegrated or loosened. Keiretsu were characterized by tight, durable relations between end-
producers and main (‘first tier’) suppliers. These relations yield several advantages, e.g. on the basis 
of reduced cognitive distance for efficient collaboration. However, they used to entail exclusiveness, 
where suppliers were banned from supplying to end producers in competing keiretsu, in order to 
prevent spillover from extensive knowledge pooling inside the keiretsu. This exclusiveness reduces 
the diversity of knowledge needed for innovative performance. To allow for more diversity, including 
larger cognitive distance, suppliers are now permitted, or even encouraged, to also supply outside the 
 20keiretsu. Spillover is increasingly seen to matter less since the change of knowledge is now so fast as 
to reduce the risk of it. When knowledge has changed by the time a competitor has absorbed and 
implemented it for competition, spillover risk drops out (Nooteboom, 1998). However, this is only a 
conjecture that would need testing against other possible reasons for  the disintegration of keiretsu. 
Concluding, we provide two indirect tests of the cognitive distance hypothesis in two very different 
empirical settings. Our findings may serve as a stimulus for direct tests and more fine-grained 
research into the role of cognitive distance, from the perspective of a cognitive theory of the firm. 
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Partner dispersion is an indicator variable for the cognitive distance that characterizes 
a firm’s cumulative portfolio of R&D agreements. This variable equals the ratio of the 
firm’s total number of different partners over its total number of agreements. The 
variable is lagged with one period. 
PRIORINNOV  This variable equals the number of firm i's prior technological innovations, i.e., the 
number of prior chemical type 1 drugs approved by the FDA. 
FIRMSIZE  The number of employees (*1000) as provided by Compustat. 
R&D  The R&D expenses as provided by Compustat (billion US dollar). 
TREND  This variable ranges from 1991 to 2000. 
D1996  Dummy variable that equals 1 in the year 1996, else 0. 
DPHARMACIA  Dummy variable that equals 1 when firm i is Pharmacia, else 0. 
DSMITHKLINE  Dummy variable that equals 1 when firm i is Smithkline, else 0. 
 23Table 2 – Descriptive statistics, empirical test 1 
 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Min.  Max. 
PARTNER DISPERSION  0.872 0.098 0.4 1 
PRIORINNOV  1.933 2.633 0 12 
FIRMSIZE  43.241 28.540 0.631 151.9 
R&D  1111.67 730.931 0.008 4435 










Basic “cognitive distance” argument in combination with working 
hypothesis: “Partner dispersion increases cognitive distance”. 
PRIORINNOV  +  Experience effect. 
FIRMSIZE  +/-  Effect of firm size in prior literature has been positive, negative and non-
significant. 
R&D  +  R&D expenses aid in the development of technological innovation. 
TREND  -  Intensified competition in the pharmaceutical industry. 
D1996  /  Control variables – no expectations regarding directional effect.  
DPHARMACIA  /   
DSMITHKLINE  /   
 
 25Table 4: Estimation results, empirical test 1 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LIKELIHOOD OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION 
   I II
 
a1  PARTNER DISPERSION  / 58.537 
    (35.296)** 
a2 (PARTNER  DISPERSION)
2  / -33.908 
    (20.466)** 
a3 PRIORINNOV  0.058 0.034 
   (0.075) (0.076) 
a4 FIRMSIZE  -0.014 -0.013 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
a5 R&D  0.001 0.001 
   0.000*** (0.000)*** 
a6 TREND  -0.089 -0.108 
   0.059 (0.061)* 
a7 D 1996  0.878 0.921 
   (0.582) (0.604) 
a8 D PHARMACIA  3.267 3.234 
   (1.117)*** (1.127)*** 
a9 D SMITHKLINE  1.022 1.247 
   (0.820) (0.881) 
a0 Constant  -0.583 -25.288 
   (0.750) (15.071)* 
     
     
 log-likelihood  -96.866 -93.841 
  n. of observations   174 174 
  LR test (d.f)  33.91(7) ***  6.05(2)** 
  Mc Fadden R-squared  0.149 0.172 
      
  Legend    
  * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors or degrees of freedom 
between parentheses. Squared terms are indicated by the suffix “2”. 
Significance of hypothesized effects is based on one-tailed test, all other 




 26Table 5 – Explanatory variables, empirical test 2 
 
Variable Operationalization 
CRTA  Value of the Pearson correlation index between the distributions of the Revealed 
Technological Advantages
a of firms across 31 technological fields related to 
Information and Communication Technologies. 
R&D  Difference between the average values of the R&D to sales ratio of firms in the 1981-
’86 period.  
SIMILARSIZE  Ratio between the average values of total sales of the smaller firm and that of the 
larger firm in any pairwise combination of sample firms in the 1981-’86 period. 
ROS  Difference between the average values of the returns on sales of firms in the 1981-’86 
period 
DIVERSIFICATION  Ratio of the difference between the average values of the Utton diversification index 
(two-digit SIC classification) of firms to the sum of such values in the 1981-’86 
period. 
SCOPE  Ratio of the difference between the average values of the Utton diversification index 
within Information and Communication Technologies (i.e. semiconductor, data 
processing, and telecommunication) of firms to the sum of such values in the 1981-’86 
period. 
SAMESECTOR  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if firms have the same primary sector of activity in 
Information and Communication Technologies. 
COMMONSECTOR  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if a) firms are in one or more common sectors in 
Information and Communication Technologies and b) SAMESECTOR equals 0. 
USA  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if a pair of firms is composed of two US firms. 
EUR  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if a pair of firms is composed of two European firms. 
JAP  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if a pair of firms is composed of two Japanese firms. 
USA-EUR  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if a pair of firms is composed of a US firm and a 
European firm. 
USA-JAP  Dummy variable: it equals 1 if a pair of firms is composed of a US firm and a Japanese 
firm. 
SIZE   Average value of total sales of firms in the 1981-’86 period (billion US $, 1980 
prices). 
ROS  Average value of the returns on sales of firms in the 1981-’86 period. 
R&D  Average value of the R&D to sales ratio of firms in the 1981-’86 period. 
DIVERSIFICATION  Average value of the Utton diversification index (two-digit SIC classification) of firms 
in the 1981-’86 period. 
SCOPE  Average value of the Utton diversification index within Information and 
Communication Technologies (i.e. semiconductor, data processing, and 
telecommunication) of firms in the 1981-’86 period. 
Legend 
a) The revealed technological advantage (RTAij) of firm i in technological class j is calculated as follows. Let Pij 
be the number of US patents granted to firm i in technological class j over the period 1969-’95. Then RTAij= 
(Pij/jPij)/(i Pij/ij Pij), i=1,….,67; j=1,….,31. 
 27Table 6 – Descriptive statistics, empirical test 2 
 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Min.  Max. 
CRTA 
0.004 0.268 -0.646 0.976 
R&D 
0.032 0.026 0 0.142 
SIMILARSIZE 
0.408 0.272 0.004 0.999 
ROS 
0.033 0.030 0 0.219 
DIVERSIFICATION 
0.234 0.169 0 0.617 
SCOPE 
0.178 0.143 0 0.458 
SAMESECTOR 
0.408 0.492 0 1 
COMMONSECTOR 
0.420 0.494 0 1 
USA 
0.254 0.435 0 1 
EUR 
0.086 0.280 0 1 
JAP 
0.035 0.185 0 1 
USA-EUR 
0.308 0.462 0 1 
USA-JAP 
0.200 0.400 0 1 
SIZE  
6.739 9.362 0.395 79.230 
ROS 
0.073 0.043 -0.117 0.220 
R&D 
0.126 0.041 0.032 0.300 
DIVERSIFICATION 
3.520 1.192 2 8.125 
SCOPE 
2.881 0.738 2 5.361 
 
 28Table 7 - Predicted sign of the coefficient of the explanatory variables, empirical test 2 
 
Variable Predicted  effect  Rationale 
CRTA  +  
CRTA2  -  Basic “technological cognitive distance” argument in 
combination with working hypothesis: “technological 
cognitive distance is negatively related to the 
correlation between the Revealed Technological 
Advantages of firms in ICT-related technological 
fields” 
R&D  + Id. 
R&D2  -  
SIMILARSIZE  + Id. 
SIMILARSIZE2  -  
ROS  + Id. 
ROS2  -  
DIVERSIFICATION  + Id. 
DIVERSIFICATION2  -  
SCOPE  + Id. 
DIVERSIFICATION  -  
SAMESECTOR  +  Horizontal cooperation is driven by competitive 
motives. 
COMMONSECTOR  +  Horizontal cooperation is driven by competitive 
motives.  
USA  ?  US firms have lower propensity towards alliances. 
Intra-region alliances are more likely than inter-region 
ones. 
EUR  +  Intra-region alliances are more likely than inter-region 
ones. 
JAP  +  Intra-region alliances are more likely than inter-region 
ones. 
USA-EUR  -  US firms have lower propensity towards alliances. 
USA-JAP  -  US firms have lower propensity towards alliances. 
Legend 
For the sake of synthesis control variables unrelated to cognitive distance are not considered. 
 
 29Table 8 – Estimation results, empirical test 2 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LIKELIHOOD OF ALLIANCE FORMATION 
   I II III  IV 
a0 Constant 
-6.621 -7.021 -7.086 -7.964
   (0.512)*** (0.597)*** (0.610)*** (0.682)***
a1 SIZE   0.059 0.063 0.069 0.078
   (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***
a2 ROS  1.315 2.496 2.358 0.908
   -1.679 -1.763 -1.759 -1.853
a3 R&D  11.737 13.753 14.069 14.912
   (1.663)*** (1.808)*** (1.975)*** (2.106)***
a4 DIVERSIFICATION  0.082 0.049 0.090 0.100
   -0.057 -0.062 -0.068 -0.068
a5 SCOPE  0.753 0.611 0.611 0.575
   (0.090)*** (0.114)*** (0.116)*** (0.117)***
a6 SAMESECTOR  0.611 0.595 0.615
   (0.281)** (0.291)** (0.293)**
a7 COMMONSECTOR  0.457 0.488 0.482
   -0.289 -0.298 -0.300
a8 USA  -0.220 -0.291 -0.172
   -0.279 -0.284 -0.288
a9 EUR  1.208 1.073 1.003
   (0.290)*** (0.297)*** (0.303)***
a10 JAP  1.033 1.020 1.156
   (0.347)*** (0.360)*** (0.366)***
a11 USA-EUR  -0.424 -0.496 -0.537
   -0.272 (0.277)* (0.281)*
a12 USA-JAP  0.013  0.118
   -0.258  -0.265
a13 CRTA  0.169 0.054
   -0.264 -0.327
a14 CRTA2   0.600
    -0.694
a15  R&D  -3.197 -7.649
   -2.856 -7.491
a16  R&D2   35.502
    -71.647
a17 SIMILARSIZE  0.611 2.702
   (0.275)** (1.160)***
a18 SIMILARSIZE2   -2.170
    (1.126)**
a19  ROS  0.996 16.241
   -2.512 (7.113)**
a20  ROS2   -134.847
    (62.659)**
a21  DIVERSIFICATION  -0.517 2.784
   -0.455 (1.514)**
a22  DIVERSIFICATION2   -6.318
    (2.757)**
a23  SCOPE  -0.723 0.139
   -0.534 -1.757
a24  SCOPE2   -2.317
    -4.025
 log-likelihood  -753.80 -722.90 -717.42 -708.74
  n. of observations   2211 2211 2211 2211
  LR test (d.f)  191.7 (5) *** 61.8 (7) *** 10.9 (6) *  17.9 (6) ***
     28.6 (12) ***
  Mc Fadden R-squared  0.113 0.149 0.156 0.166
Legend 
* p<0.10;** p<0.05;*** p<0.01. Significance of hypothesized effects is based on one-tailed test, all other effects are based on 
two-tailed tests. Standard errors or degrees of freedom between parentheses. Squared terms are indicated by the suffix “2”.The 
second LR test in column IV relates to the null hypothesis that the twelve coefficients of the cognitive distance variables are 
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